The aim of the paper is to analyse the ongoing transformation process within the Islamist movements using the example of the moderate Islamic Action Front party in Jordan. The dilemma of participation in the 2010 general elections raised tensions between the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, and between doves and hawks of the same organizations. Internal debate on the future has started recently among different groups within the Islamist movement in Jordan. 
governments and asking for further political liberalization. The regimes themselves and the Islamist movements are at crossroads on political participation accepting the current, nondemocratic rules of the game. Many Western politicians argue against the integration of Islamist movements within the existing political framework using the example of the election victory of Hamas in 2006 as a negative reference point. Many other experts believe in political inclusion as a tool of moderation, alarming us that exclusion may strengthen the possibility of re-radicalization. Both experts and politicians often neglect the fact that these Islamist movements are not homogenous entities, as serious internal differences on the future exist endangering the cohesion of these organizations. A re-interpretation of former political goals and ideological principles has started among different political fractions within Islamists.
Recent literature on Middle Eastern political developments shows a certain kind of transformation within Islamist movements, what the French scholar, Olivier Roy called as -Post-Islamism‖. The religious-oriented political movements have begun to emphasize the unresolved national problems instead of focusing only on the international scene. National integration and political participation became a viable alternative of a radical, military interference into the political life of the state. Most of the leaders of these moderate organizations accept the peaceful coexistence with the ruling elite, ‗postponing' the primary goal of implementation of an Islamic state based on Sharia at the same time. As Roy pointed out, the main ideological commitment of Islamists is not politics, but society: -The contemporary religious revival in Islam is targeting society more than the state...‖ 3 More and more Islamist organizations have started to give up the military struggle against the infidel authoritarian regime, which was the ultimate answer in the 1970s by many armed movements (e.g. Islamic Jihad, Takfir wa-l Hijra).
Islamist movements have embedded more deeply into the national environment. Roy notes: -The mainstream Islamist movements in the 1990s have failed to produce anything resembling an ‗Islamist International' along the lines of the Communist International (or Comintern).‖ 4 The case of Hamas and Fatah as rival organizations can help to understand the impact of national interests on political movements. Islamic symbols are not only used in the Palestinian Authority by Hamas, but also by the more nationalist party, Fatah. And vice versa, Fatah gains popularity by relying on Islamic ideals, which clearly shows that a pragmatist approach is more beneficial than relying on a dogmatic ideology without flexibility. Another example of the nationalization of Islamist movements is the Shiite Hezbollah, which was viewed by many experts as the right hand of the Iranian theocratic regime. Recent articles have shown a different picture. The so-called -libanonization‖ of Hezbollah started in 1992 with participation in the Lebanese government and with the gradual rejection of armed struggle. It must be underlined that with the presence of a Post-Islamist trend, classical Islamism is not a phenomenon of the past. -But the advent of post-Islamism, as a trend, should not be seen necessarily as the historical end of Islamism‖ -wrote Bayat. 8 According to his interpretation of current trends in the Middle East, the Egyptian Wasat Party, the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the Indian Jami'at-i Islami belong to the category of Post-Islamism. Movements like the Palestinian Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or the Jordanian Islamic Action Front represent (classical) Islamism. However, in my opinion there is no clear dividing line among different types of movements, especially because the new movements usually split from the mother organization, as was the case with the Egyptian Wasat Party. The existence of divergent fractions within the Islamist movements must be taken into consideration.
Politicians and experts often show Islamist movements as static political actors with neverchanging political agenda. It is often neglected that an intensive debate on the future started between members belonging to the different political wings (and different generations) of these popular societal movements. The main disagreement among political fractions is about participation in the general elections and the commitment to the original ideology of the founding fathers. On one hand, the usually called -dovish members‖ think that a Sharia-based society and political system is the best solution for the contemporary challenges of their host country. However, at the same time they also noticed that the implementation of the ideological principles is not possible in the 21 st century. These moderates show a willingness to form ad-hoc coalitions with secular parties and cooperate with the regime on issues with shared interests. On the other hand, the conservatives (-hawkish‖) see any kind of political participation as a legitimization given to the oppressive policies of the regime. The existing political fractions often correspond with members belonging to different generations.
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THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Many Islamist movements consider the opportunity cost of exclusion higher than political participation. However, political inclusion is not only a decision of Islamists themselves, but usually it is the privilege of the ruling elite. A minimum level of mutual understanding and an acceptance of the existence and political activity of the other is necessary, but not satisfactory precondition for political inclusion. The compromise between Islamists and the regime usually touches upon the rules of the political game. These non-democratic arrangements are used as the safety valves of the political elite, minimizing the possibility of the evolution of a popular political party in the opposition. Despite the authoritarian structure of the state, many of the moderate Islamists are still convinced of the advantages of manoeuvring into the political labyrinth, which offers no real influence on political decisions. Some moderate movements are legally licensed political parties (e.g. Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan, Justice and Development Party in Morocco, Islah Party in Yemen), while others belong to the semi-legal (Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt), or illegal categories (Muslim Brotherhood in Syria).
A re-interpretation of former political goals and ideological principles has started among different political fractions within the ranks of the Islamists. These political wings often coincide with members belonging to different generations. Khalil Anani, an expert on Islamist movements, analyzed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and found four generations of members very different aspirations, with very different experiences. 10 Some of the members who were among the founding fathers are still alive and they are the more conservative element. The other generation lived under the Nasser years witnessed the radicalization of the movement, and they are loyal to the more radical interpretation of Sayyid Qutb, who was hanged by Nasser. The youngest generation is the most interesting; they live in a very different political environment than their predecessors. We were told that Islamist movements are backward political actors in the postmodern society. It is not true. The youngest generation has access to the latest technology, they communicate among the members through blogs and chats. As most of the blogs (like Ana Ikhwan) are in Arab language, these blogs are not exclusively Egyptian or Jordanian, but Arab. The youngest generation is very skeptical about the old guard and usually they are in the middle (wasat). Sometimes they try to break away from the parent organization and form a new political party (Wasat Party). They are in the middle between the doves and hawks. The same story is valid in the case of Hamas, which after the outbreak of the second intifada started a debate on participation in the upcoming elections. Hamas shows the major dilemma of inclusion or exclusion. The moderate wing led by Ismail Haniyya argued in favor of participation, accepting the non-democratic rules of the game, while the more radical element -Khaled Meshal in Damascus -stressed the importance of the armed struggle. Most of the moderate movements in the Middle East face the same dilemma: participation or re-radicalization. The result of the international isolation of the Hamas government led to re-radicalization in the Gaza strip. More radical movements belong to the Al-Qaeda, Jihadi Salafism emerged as a response to the failure of Hamas. They totally ban music and one of their political leaders even called for an Islamic Emirate in Gaza. Hamas killed most of the members of this organization. It shows us that Islamist movements cannot be analyzed as static political actors who never change. The other general question about the future of the Islamists is whether they are committed more to the founding ideology and to establishing an Islamist state on the base of Shariah or they are more pragmatic and open to hear the needs of their voters (context driven). Several studies have shown that many Islamist movements dropped their primary goal to establish an Islamic state and realized the opportunity to participate in elections and forming coalition with other non-Islamist parties or even more committed to certain kind of cooperation with the regime.
-Inclusion leads to moderation‖ hypothesis should be tested in a more careful manner. Th much criticized transition paradigm believes in the inclusion of radical groups in the democratization process.
11 If the alternative cost of participating in the election process is higher than keeping the radical tone of the movement, then acceptance of the democratic and non-violent method will prevail. In the Middle East, however, the rules of the game are usually undemocratic, which means that enforcing the democratic principle does not mean the possibility of challenging the regime.
POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE JORDANIAN POLITICAL MILIEU
In a recently published article, Tamara Cofman Wittes has analysed three different groups of Islamist movements regarding the possibility of engaging them politically. 12 The first category used by the author is a small group of radical organizations linked to the so-called global jihad. The most prominent example for that category is Al-Qaeda, or second generation of Al-Qaeda type organizations targeting mainly Western interests. Engaging them is not possible on the shortrun. A recent survey in the Islamic World carried out by Gallup has showed the weakness of such radicals. According to the data, only 7 percent of 1.5 billion Muslims support any kind of violence, while there is a ‗silenced majority' who rejects the use of force. 13 Within the second category, we found Islamists focusing mainly on national or local issues combining peaceful and militant methods as well. Hamas in the Palestinian Authority or Hezbollah in Lebanon are the most prominent examples of this group. As Wittes said: ‗they can always use bullets to cancel ballots (…) and they seldom want to give up the privileges that the gun brings them. ' 14 Participation in politics is not a positive step toward democratizing autocratic regimes.
The third category of Islamists are the peaceful, local, nationalist ones who see participation in the political process as the sole legitimate method for challenging the regime. Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front Party, or Turkey's AKP are the most important Islamist organizations accepting the formal rules of the game. If certain conditions are met, these nonradical groups are the best example for inclusion within the political space.
GLOBAL JIHAD IN JORDAN
In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, all of the three above-mentioned types of Islamist movements exist. Organizations linked to global jihadi activity were never popular in Jordan. The Jordanian society has strongly condemned the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States, and the government officially expressed its commitment to Washington in the war against terrorism. On the other hand, close political ties with Washington has made Jordanian public opinion suspicious about foreign policy initiatives of the King or government. According to the poll conducted by Pew, 43 percent of the Jordanian population supported terror attack against civilians in order to defend Islam in the summer of 2002. The sympathy toward suicide bombing however dropped to 29 percent in 2006. 15 Mentioning just a few examples of names and organizations with links to global jihad, Abdullah Azzam, Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, al-Maqdisi and the radical movement called Hizb ul-Tahrir (HT) are of special importance. The root of every kind of Islamist activity, whether peaceful or violent, is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which officially came into existence in 1945. According to many sources, the MB started its activity during the 1930's under the patronage of the Egyptian MB. Even Abdullah Azzam, who was at the forefront of the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, came from the Jordanian MB. As Shmuel Bar in his article on the history of the Jordanian MB has noted, the radical wing led by Abdullah Azzam, which left the country for Afghanistan during the 1980's, was unique in Jordan. Azzam and his followers were not satisfied with the peaceful strategy of the leadership; they wanted a more rapid political and societal change through armed jihad. 16 While Azzam died in Afghanistan in 1989, several of the so-called Arab Afghans (Maqdisi, Zarqawi) returned to Jordan, participating in the recruitment of new Salafis. The agglomeration of Amman, especially Zarqa (where Zarqawi was born) and Salt, became a centre of radical Islamists. After several years in prison, Zarqawi joined the Taliban in 1999 with several hundreds of Jordanian followers. Until the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States, radical jihadi activism was on a low level in the Kingdom. Maqdisi was also imprisoned in 1996. 18 The regime responded with an illiberal counter-terrorism law, which enlarged the powers of the security services. It is greatly 15 18 Many Jordanians share the conviction that Jordan will not be able to avoid the impacts of the security situation in Iraq.
The suicide bombings against Amman's 5-star hotels in 2005 were the first step toward a worsening security prospect. 21 Nabahani had tried to register his movement as a political party in the Kingdom, but it was refused by the regime several times. HT as an illegal organization attempted to overthrow the monarchy in Jordan, but the movement denied this fact. Today, HT is not a significant political group in the Kingdom; its main area of operation is Central Asia and the Muslim communities in Western Europe.
THE MODERATE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE REGIME
As mentioned before, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood originated in the 1930's, when the writings of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, influenced Muslims around the Middle East. In 1945, Emir Abdullah himself delivered the inauguration speech of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which marked the beginning of a positive approach by the Hashemite dynasty toward Islamists. The regime played the Islamist card in order to balance the powerful secular-nationalist wave calling for revolution. Only the radical Hizb alTahrir (HT) was banned during the Cold War years and the Brotherhood remained a political party and civil organization. The Muslim Brotherhood won only 8.3 percent of the votes in the 1956 election, which showed the limited popularity of Islamism at that time. 22 From 1957 till 1992, all political parties were banned in Jordan; the Muslim Brotherhood was a semi-legal political organization focusing on non-political issues (charity).
In this short paper, it is not possible to go into details about the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it must be noted that at historical turning points (1957, 1970) members of the Ikhwan supported the controversial policies of the regime. In 1957, when leftist revolutionary forces challenged the legitimacy of the Hashemite dynasty and the monarchy, the MB -despite differences over the dismissal of Glubb Pasha during the early 1950's -backed the decision of King Hussein striking down the Nasser-backed political forces in the Kingdom. 23 In 1970, when the civil war broke out between the Palestinian fighters and the monarchy (Black September), the Muslim Brotherhood again proved its loyalty to the regime. 
INTERNAL DEBATES WITHIN THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE ROLE OF THE HAMAS FACTOR
The Jordanian monarchy is a unique example of political engagement of moderate Islamism in the Middle East. This paper shows that the participation of moderate Islamists in the political process is one of the most effective ways to pacify the radicals. The political evolution of the Hashemite Kingdom is quite different from other Middle Eastern countries, but the experience on the history of Islamism in Jordan is vital for our understanding of other regime types.
From the beginning of 1990's, the Islamist Action Front became the most popular political party in the monarchy. Generally, political parties are very weak in Jordan. The election system favours independent leaders affiliated with a tribe supporting the dynasty. The election law in force was drafted in 1993, months before the elections (in 1993) to marginalize the vociferous critics of the regime, the Islamic Action Front, which dominated (as independent candidates) the legislature from 1989 till 1993. The 1993 election law was based on the one man, one vote system, whereby eligible citizens can cast only one vote per district. The authorities changed the size of voting districts in favour of tribal areas, thereby playing on personal relations and loyalties. The voting system evidently placed parties at the margin of political life appealing to the neo-patriarchal arrangement of the state. 26 In the Hashemite Kingdom, usually tribal leaders have been elected as MP. Political parties are viewed as suspicious institutions, potentially influenced by foreign powers.
When the leaders of the Ikhwan decided to establish a political party, the assumption was to fill 40 percent of the Islamic Action Front with independent Islamists, and the rest (60 percent) with members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In reality, the Muslim Brotherhood has been dominating by the Islamic Action Front Party and independent Islamists have been marginalized from the beginning. This initiated a debate among members of the party on participation in the election process, the role of women in politics, the meaning of the dreamed Islamic states in the 21 st century, etc. A major transformation process has started within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has become a Western-like political movement. As Anne Sofie Roald noted in her article: ‗the three religious concepts, shura, ‗Islamic state', and ‗female leadership' have all turned in a secular direction in the policy of the Muslim Brotherhood, as shura has become ‗western democracy', ‗Islamic state' has become ‗civil state', and ‗Islamic leadership' has, to a certain extent, started to involve even women in the pattern of gender equality.
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The old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood (e.g. Ishaq Farhan) emphasized its opposition to allow the participation of the Ikhwan in the election process from 1989. They argued that the current political regime in Jordan is not democratic, and with participation in the election process, the Muslim Brotherhood would be a party to the oppressive actions of the government. It must be noted that most of the Ikhwan members were in favour of participatory politics in 1989 instead of boycotting elections. In 2007, Islamists boycotted municipal elections. They participated in the 2007 general elections, but the outcome of the elections was a political disaster for the Islamic Action Front Party. Only 6 of its 22 candidates won a seat in the Parliament, which was a major setback for the party. The main reason behind this negative performance was a miscalculation of the popularity of the organization among voters. They were sure that all of the 22 candidates would win a seat, as it was in the previous elections. However, the situation was different. Why did they fail? One of the answers was the political marginalization of the Islamist movement by the regime. As the relations between the regime and the IAF worsened, especially in the post 9/11 contexts, Islamists were ousted from university campuses, from NGOs, etc. Only professional unions were open for them. A strict control started, especially at the University of Jordan, among student organizations active in campuses. One of the techniques to oust professors affiliated with the MB was not to renew their contracts or simply ask them to leave the university. The regime accused MB of playing in the hands of the ‗Shia crescent'. The Jordanian King was the one who introduced the term Shia Crescent after the outbreak of the Third Gulf War (2003), referring to the cooperation between Iran-Syria-Hezbollah and the Sunni Hamas. The other thing equally important was that the IAF could not reach to the ordinary Jordanian audience, and kept focusing mainly on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. According to CSS polls, the Transjordanian cast their ballots according to their tribal affiliation and not their political ideology. 31 Tribal affiliation is not a top priority among Palestinian citizens. The current crisis within the movement started in the middle of the election campaign. While the MB wanted to boycott completely both elections, the IAF members preferred participation. . Several thousand attended the demonstration. As the general public opinion is very negative about Israel, the King has started to co-opt an anti-Israeli rhetoric. In his interview with Wall Street Journal, he criticized the current Israeli government and told the American audience that Israel endangered its existence due to its politics (settlement policy issues).
33 And right after the Gaza flotilla raid, the King brought to Jordan most of the Muslim citizens who were aboard the Turkish ship, offering them medical treatment and helping them to go home. The strategy of the King worked very well; the regime, using a part of the rhetoric of the Islamist movement, distanced the population from Islamists.
A general election within the IAF organization is expected this spring. After the first meeting, which elected the Shura Council, the main decision-making body of the IAF, a major split surfaced within the movement and it was propagated widely in the media causing frustration for the Islamist movement. As usual, the Shura Council of the parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood is the body responsible for the nomination of the next Secretary General of the party, and they nominated Zaki bin Irshaid, the former secretary general who resigned in 2009. The doves did not accept this decision and boycotted the session, which was supposed to elect Zaki bin Irshaid. However, Zaki bin Irshaid withdrew his nomination and Hamam Said disclosed that a kind of reconciliation had started within the movement. The global leadership of the movement from Egypt visited Amman to arrange a settlement of the dispute. The doves did not nominate a new person for the position, leaving the job open to the doves, who nominated several candidates. On 26 th June, in a meeting of the Party's council, Hamzah Mansour was elected the General Secretary. The election of Hamzah Mansour -a member of the moderate fraction -is a compromise between the doves and the hawks.
The hawks prefer election boycott, while the doves prioritize participation. The executive director of the IAF issued an announcement before the beginning of the registration process calling the members to register themselves for the upcoming elections, but it does not mean participation. The probability of a boycott of the next elections was very high, especially after the King endorsed the new election law. The election law keeps the -one man, one system‖, which is politically unacceptable for the Islamists. In 2010, Islamists started a discussion with secular parties about the election law and a joint boycott of the next election to draw the attention of the international community to the oppressive nature of the regime. According to the polls conducted by the Centre of Strategic Studies, the popularity of the IAF is very low, much less than 10% among voters. Finally, IAF called for a boycott of the elections, which was held in November 2010. In 2011, IAF accepted a new strategic document for enlarging the members of the party, which was estimated around 3000 by experts.
The generalization of the Jordanian model is not possible because of the unique historical context and political circumstances. The Islamic Action Front Party is a popular, but politically marginalized movement. The example of the Islamic Action Party shows that legalized Islamist parties are not inevitable winners of general elections in the Middle East, and they can be co-opted by the autocratic (or semi-democratic) regime successfully. However, the future of the Islamists' participation in politics of the Kingdom is still an open question. Post-Islamism is not a strong force in Jordan (as in Egypt), it is a rather marginalized fraction cooperating with the regime, and (classical) Islamism has also lost popularity in recent years.
